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TOWARD A FEMINIST POLITICAL THEORY 
OF JUDGING: NEITHER THE NIGHTMARE 
NOR THE NOBLE DREAM 
Sally J. Kenney* 
I am honored to offer some thoughts about feminist judging on the occa-
sion of the publication of The Feminist Judgments Project.1 It is also an honor 
to be in the great state of Florence Allen2 whom, as I have written,3 but for her 
intimate partner choice of another woman, might have been our first woman 
Supreme Court justice. I write as a political scientist among legal academics. 
My most recent work has focused on women judges and, in particular, the ef-
forts of social movements to increase their number. I have worked with women 
judges from Tbilisi, Georgia, to Cairo, Egypt, to Nairobi, Kenya. And from 
Minnesota and the Eighth Circuit (with the lowest percentage of women judg-
es) to the great state of Louisiana in the Fifth Circuit (with the highest percent-
age of women judges). 
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Bernette Joshua 
Johnson, is an African-American woman. Standing in front of the statue of 
Chief Justice Edward White, who joined the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
Louisiana’s former Attorney General, Buddy Caldwell, said at Justice John-
son’s investiture, “it’s one for the anals [sic] of history.”4 As one who has stud-
ied women judges worldwide; worked to secure confirmation of President 
                                                        
*  Sally J. Kenney is the Newcomb College Endowed Chair, the Director of the Newcomb 
College Institute, a Professor of Political Science, and an affiliated faculty member of the 
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1  The U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, TEMP. U., https://sites.temple.edu/usfeministjudg 
ments/ [https://perma.cc/LTR7-42TK] (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
2  Florence Allen was the first woman assistant county prosecutor in the United States and 
“the first woman elected to a judicial office in Ohio. Later, she became the first woman in 
the nation to be elected to a court of the last resort—the Supreme Court of Ohio—and the 
first woman appointed to a federal appeals court judgeship.” Florence Ellinwood Allen, SUP. 
CT. OHIO & OHIO JUD. SYS. https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/formerjustices/bi 
os/allen.asp [https://perma.cc/6PZ4-AFWU] (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
3  Sally J. Kenney, “It Would Be Stupendous for Us Girls”: Campaigning for Women Judges 
Without Waving, in BREAKING THE WAVE 209, 211–15 (Kathleen A. Laughlin & Jacqueline 
L. Castledine eds., 2011). 
4  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Obama’s nominees as part of the Why Courts Matter movement;5 co-founded 
an organization to secure a more diverse and representative bench in the Eighth 
Circuit;6 co-organized a research network of more than 140 scholars worldwide 
who study gender and judging;7 and brought a comparativist’s eye to our deep-
ly troubled politics of judicial selection, I have some thoughts on judging. 
When I delivered an earlier version of this essay on October 21, 2016, I be-
lieved voters would elect Hillary Clinton President but that Republicans would 
have a majority in both houses of Congress. At that time, I was profoundly 
worried about our broken judicial selection system and anticipated that the 
Senate would continue to obstruct judicial nominees as it had under President 
Obama. Before I reflect on our current situation now that Donald Trump’s 
nominee, Neil Gorsuch, has been sworn in,  let me describe the problem as I 
saw it on October 21, 2016. 
One definition of a cynic is someone who no longer believes but still 
speaks. The Republican senators who refused to hold hearings to consider Pres-
ident Obama’s appointment of Merrick Garland to the U.S. Supreme Court are 
aptly labeled cynics by that definition. The Senate confirmed Garland to the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in 1997 with Republican support by a vote of 
76–23 (But Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and current Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) both voted 
against him).8 
For years, Senator Grassley, a Republican, and Iowa’s Democratic Senator, 
Tom Harkin, upheld their pact not to sabotage each other’s judicial appoint-
ments; they were a national model of bipartisan cooperation. The thirty-year 
bargain served both well. Not that long ago, Grassley supported President 
Obama’s appointment of public defender Jane Kelly to the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, only the second woman ever to serve on that court, at a time when 
he was refusing to support hearings or votes on other nominees.9 Sadly, that 
commitment to turn-taking and recognition of presidential prerogatives even in 
time of divided government ended when Senator Harkin retired in 2015 and 
Iowa voters elected Republican Joni Ernst. A coalition of good government 
                                                        
5  WHY COURTS MATTER, https://whycourtsmatter.org [https://perma.cc/BHH8-MFAH] (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
6  INFINITY PROJECT, http://www.theinfinityproject.org [https://perma.cc/4V4D-VQ45] (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
7  Collaborative Research Networks: Gender and Judging, LSA, http://www.lawandsociet 
y.org/crn.html#32 [https://perma.cc/FX6W-857W] (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
8  Alexander Bolton, McConnell, Grassley Voted Against Garland in 1997, HILL (Mar. 16, 
2016, 10:46 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/273217-mcconnell-grassley-voted-a 
gainst-garland-in-1997 [https://perma.cc/2SEG-6EM3]. 
9  As Sarah Binder’s research shows, however, senators have been more reluctant to block 
when the circuit court in question is not equally balanced. Senator Grassley knew that con-
firming Jane Kelly would do little to change the strong conservative tilt of the Eighth Circuit. 
Sarah Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Is Advice and Consent Broken? The Contentious Politics 
of Confirming Federal Judges and Justices, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 399, 407–08 (Law-
rence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 11th ed. 2017). 
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groups under the moniker Why Courts Matter pursued Grassley around the 
state with the demand that he “do his job.”10 Although Garland is a white man, 
who Obama chose because the judge enjoyed bipartisan support, the Senate’s 
strategy of obstruction and delay has impeded President Obama’s attempts to 
make the entire federal judiciary more diverse and representative, which he has 
done nevertheless. Republicans have stopped confirmations even when home 
state Republican senators supported the President’s nominees.11 
Second in cynicism, or perhaps simply hypocrisy, was Louisiana’s Senator 
David Vitter. When President Bush was in office and the Democrats controlled 
the Senate, Senator Vitter declared that every nominee deserved an up or down 
vote by the Senate.12 Vitter, too, had praised Garland’s credentials for the fed-
eral judiciary when he voted to confirm him for a circuit court judgeship. As a 
lame duck, Senator Vitter was the member of the Judiciary Committee who de-
nied unanimous consent to hold a hearing. Having failed spectacularly in his 
run for governor of Louisiana because he was so unpopular within his own par-
ty, Vitter (the staunch supporter of family values who was shown to have visit-
ed prostitutes)13 need not fear his party or primary opponents from the right, 
unlike senators facing close elections this year, yet he reversed his position and 
blocked the nomination. 
Republican senators invoked the so-called Thurmond rule, arguing that 
Obama was too late in his term to discharge his constitutional duty to nominate 
members of the Supreme Court, despite the fact that the Senate has previously 
confirmed Supreme Court justices including Anthony Kennedy in an election 
year.14 Those same senators were easily able to secure the confirmation of Pres-
ident Bush’s nominees late in his term. Bush left office with no pending judi-
cial nominees; while fifty-four of President Obama’s nominations languished.15 
                                                        
10  Tell Senator Grassley: Do Your Job, WHY COURTS MATTER IOWA, http://act.progressio 
wa.org/sign/grassleydoyourjob/ [https://perma.cc/LS96-3R73] (last visited Apr. 12. 2016). 
11  Binder & Maltzman, supra note 9, at 400. 
12  Ed Brayton, Republicans: Nominees Must Get up or down Vote!, PATHEOS (Feb. 17, 2016) 
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/dispatches/2016/02/17/republicans-nominees-must-get-up-or-
down-vote/ [https://perma.cc/RHL7-2EH3]. 
13  Senator Vitter’s double standards are even more troubling when we recognize the large 
number of women and transgender sex workers in Louisiana who have been convicted of 
felonies for “crimes against nature” and forced to register as sex offenders, while those who 
seek sex for money are free to run for public office. See generally, e.g., Susan Dewey & 
Tonia P. St. Germain, Sex Workers/Sex Offenders: Exclusionary Criminal Justice Practices 
in New Orleans, 10 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 211 (2015); Kelsey Meeks Duncan, A Crime 
Against Common Sense: How Louisiana’s Implementation of the Adam Walsh Act Exposes 
the Law’s Most Significant Flaw, 84 TULANE L. REV. 429, 431 (2009); Joseph Fischel, 
Against Nature, Against Consent: A Sexual Politics of Debility, 24 DIFFERENCES 55, 59 
(2015). 
14  Gregor Aisch et al., Scalia’s Supreme Court Seat Has Been Vacant for More than 400 
Days, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/15/us/sup 
reme-court-nominations-election-year-scalia.html [https://perma.cc/348M-WHWM]. 
15  Philip Rucker & Robert Barnes, Trump to Inherit More than 100 Court Vacancies, Plans 
to Reshape Judiciary, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli 
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An additional forty-seven vacancies existed where senate obstruction led to no 
nomination at all.16 By their logic, Grassley and Vitter, as senators who neared 
the end of their elected term, should not have participated in the legislative pro-
cess. Even more cynical was the debate among senators such as New Hamp-
shire’s Kelly Ayote and Arizona’s Jeff Flake before the election as to whether 
they should have quickly confirmed Garland in a lame duck session, fearing 
that a President Hillary Clinton would nominate someone younger and more 
progressive.17 If President Obama’s nomination was too late to be legitimate, 
surely voting on it when he and many senators were lame ducks would have 
been even less legitimate. But we are no longer operating in the arena of prin-
ciple. 
Tulane Political Science Professor Nancy Maveety’s presidential primer 
Picking Judges reminds us that Supreme Court nominations have often been 
contentious and sometimes the Senate has voted not to confirm.18 Yet never in 
our history have senators been so brazenly cynical in refusing to consider a 
nomination altogether, as opposed to voting against confirming them in com-
mittee or as a whole in the Senate. Politico refers to it as a blockade.19 Is it, as 
Senator Elizabeth Warren suggests, because they denied the legitimate power 
of our first black president?20 We know, for example, that Senator Richard Burr 
of North Carolina has engaged in a blockade of African-American nominees 
for the Eastern District of North Carolina.21 Captured by the Tea Party, do Sen-
ate Republicans believe that the only legitimate role of a member of Congress 
is to prevent the government and the judiciary from functioning? Beginning 
                                                                                                                                 
tics/trump-to-inherit-more-than-100-court-vacancies-plans-to-reshape-judiciary/2016/12/25/ 
d190dd18-c928-11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html?utm_term=.4b127246cbd6 [https://pe 
rma.cc/77RR-KZM4]. 
16  Burgess Everett & Seung Min Kim, Judge Not: GOP Blocks Dozens of Obama Court 
Picks, POLITICO (July 6, 2015, 8:08 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/payback-
gop-blocks-obama-judge-picks-judiciary-119743 [https://perma.cc/8GPF-7PPA]. 
17  Seung Min Kim & Burgess Everett, GOP Supreme Court Blockade Showing Early 
Cracks, POLITICO (Mar. 16, 2016, 4:02 PM) http://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/kelly-ay 
otte-to-meet-merrick-garland-220868 [https://perma.cc/7M87-GK9U]. 
18  See generally NANCY MAVEETY, PICKING JUDGES (2016). See also LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY 
A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2005); 
SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES (1997). 
19  Burgess Everett, GOP Rallies Around Court Blockade, POLITICO (May 8, 2016, 4:23 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/gop-supreme-court-merrick-garland-222898 
[https://perma.cc/R4BW-8LVM]. 
20  Michael McAuliff, Elizabeth Warren Hammers GOP over Supreme Court Obstruction, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2016, 5:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/elizabeth-
warren-supreme-court-obstruction_us_56e08863e4b0860f99d7a19d [https://perma.cc/586V-
PW72]; OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, GOING TO EXTREMES: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND SENATE REPUBLICANS’ UNPRECEDENTED RECORD OF OBSTRUCTION OF PRESIDENT 
OBAMA’S NOMINEES 1 (2016) https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-6-6_W 
arren_SCOTUS_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM62-GUVJ]. 
21  Anne Blythe, Burr Vows to Block Obama Nomination to NC Federal Court Seat, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Apr. 28, 2016, 6:51 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-govern 
ment/state-politics/article74534012.html [https://perma.cc/R7Z4-PXFW]. 
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with the contention over the appointment of Robert Bork to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, we have descended into dangerous times of total war over judicial ap-
pointments. Just as our presidential politics have sunk to a new low, I believe 
our judicial selection process has been in crisis for some time and is now bro-
ken.22  
With the recent allegations against Donald Trump that surfaced before and 
after the second debate, I watched several Trump pundits say that they deplored 
Donald Trump’s propensity toward sexual assault but that they supported him 
anyway because the future of the Supreme Court was at stake. Better to have a 
sexual predator for a President than to let the Democrats replace Justice Scalia 
with a moderate the way Republicans replaced Sandra Day O’Connor with 
someone more conservative. 
Our government of separate branches sharing powers only works if the par-
ticipants bargain and take turns rather than simply block one another. I once 
heard Cornell West voice an eloquent criticism of Fidel Castro, imploring him 
to follow the democratic maxim “you’ve got to rotate.” One hallmark of a de-
mocracy is that we hold elections and the losers leave office. In the latter twen-
tieth century, as countries transitioned to democracy in Latin America, Eastern 
Europe, and Africa, drafters of new constitutions for nations and intergovern-
mental organizations found courts useful for more than regulating the rules of 
commerce and deciding who had committed crimes. First, courts provide an 
important check on the administrative power of a strong executive, which is 
why even polities historically hostile to judicial review, such as the European 
Union,23 the United Kingdom, and France24 came to embrace their distinctive 
versions of it. Courts insist that the bureaucratic state follow its own rules. 
Second, courts increasingly became the guarantor of human rights—
whether enumerated in amendments to the constitution, such as our own bill of 
rights or in international treaty obligations.25 Some legal theorists have valor-
ized courts as a check on the power of democratically-elected majorities to de-
prive minorities of rights. Others, as the guardians who reinforce representative 
democracy.26 Lastly, newly democratizing states hoped that judicial review and 
an independent judiciary would ensure that leaving office after losing an elec-
tion would not mean permanent exile. Instead, as Cornell West suggested, par-
ties would take turns and “rotate.” For a time, Iowa Senators Harkin and Grass-
                                                        
22  Binder & Maltzman, supra note 9, at 400; see also SARAH A. BINDER & FORREST 
MALTZMAN, ADVICE AND DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 
(2009). 
23  Mauro Cappelletti, The “Mighty Problem” of Judicial Review and the Contribution of 
Comparative Analysis, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 409, 412 (1980). 
24  See generally ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE (1992). 
25  See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); CHARLES R. EPP, 
THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1998); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (3d ed. 2003). 
26  See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
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ley understood the principle of turn taking for governing. In October, I argued 
we were headed for dangerous times because I believed a Republican Senate 
would simply refuse to act on President Hillary Clinton’s judicial nominations. 
But now I believe the times are even more dangerous as Democrats endeavor to 
decide how to respond as a minority in the Senate to more than 100 potential 
Trump nominees, having lost the ability to filibuster future Supreme Court 
nominees. 
Political and legal theorists struggle to elaborate why non-elected judges 
should wield such enormous political power in democracies, or more accurate-
ly, constitutional republics.27 We have on the one-hand, legal formalists arguing 
that judges merely deductively apply rules or agreed upon hierarchies of prin-
ciples.28 Of course, the cases that come to the highest appellate courts are often 
precisely those cases where the objective rule or principle is in dispute or prin-
ciples conflict with each other. On the other extreme, some, including many po-
litical scientists in my subfield of public law—judicial behavioralists—argue 
that judges simply make policy choices and retroactively cloak their decisions 
in legal discourse justifying their actions to conceal their exercise of illegiti-
mate power.29 Partisans tend to whipsaw between these two extremes: (1) when 
a court is dominated by the opposite party, partisans view judges as exercising 
naked power, imposing their policy choices rather than deferring to elected 
bodies; or (2) when their own party is in power, a court is merely following the 
pre-agreed upon rules. H.L.A. Hart called this distinction “the nightmare” and 
“the noble dream.”30 The problem with the Grassleys, the Vitters, and the 
Trump supporters is that their inconsistent position has completely eroded any 
pretense of support for the noble dream of legal determinacy, and we are left 
with simply the nightmare of judges as wielders of raw undemocratic power. 
I reject both positions as well as the hypocritical oscillation between them. 
I believe in principles and consistency, which is why the law appeals to me, de-
spite its many failures to live up to this aspiration. Alas, my position is more 
difficult to convey in a tweet or a short political ad. I see law as three things: a 
system of rules, a discourse, and an arena of contestation. One need not be a 
legal formalist to recognize law does provide rules for which we have consider-
able agreement even across ideological differences. To use the sports analogy 
favored by Chief Justice Roberts, we agree on the strike zone and the question 
is merely was the pitch in the zone or not.31 
                                                        
27  See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., 3d ed.1998). 
28  See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012). 
29  Nancy Maveety, The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political Science, in 
THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 1, 3 (Nancy L. Maveety ed., 2003). 
30  NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM 332 
(2004). 
31  Interestingly, the ABA has recently used the example of umpires refereeing black pitchers 
in their trainings on implicit bias. Andrea Ciobanu et al., Pub. Educ. Comm., Am. Bar Assoc. 
Young Lawyers Div., CLE Presentation at the Renaissance Pittsburgh Rhapsody: Practicing 
Law While Breaking the Confines of Implicit Bias in and Outside the Courtroom (May 17, 
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To think of law as a discourse is to understand the way that legal adjudica-
tion shapes how we think. In order for women or gender minorities to have 
equal protection rights, for example, they have to draw analogies between their 
oppression and that of racial minorities. Legal discourse determines the burdens 
litigants must meet, for example, whether state restrictions on abortion consti-
tute an undue burden is a different question than whether such restrictions deny 
women dignity or whether such rules violate the fundamental rights of doctors, 
women, or fetuses. Law as a discourse shapes how we frame disputes. In Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, for example, the majority asked whether the Constitution con-
tained the right to sodomy.32 The dissenters began with the framing question: Is 
there a constitutional right to privacy that encompasses private and consensual 
adult same-sex sexual practices? 
Law as a discourse also requires categorizing things and drawing analo-
gies. Are gay people criminals, like pedophiles, as Justice Scalia argued in his 
dissent in Lawrence v. Texas,33 or are they minorities whose fundamental pri-
vacy and equality rights and dignity need protecting by courts against demo-
cratic majorities? Or is the criminalization of gay couples more akin to state 
bans against interracial marriage that the Supreme court found to be unconstitu-
tional in Loving v. Virginia?34 Is sexual orientation like race, immutable, or is it 
merely a lifestyle choice? 
Law is also an arena, a political space where we debate the most important 
issues of the day. In this arena, all are not equal. Those well versed in legal 
procedure and discourse have power over those who are not. The rich and the 
skilled have greater ability to bring evidence to bear. To win, claimants have to 
make their claims intelligible to the judges and jurors who decide. Those who 
are different, or less skilled, risk not being heard or understood. Courts are also 
arenas for raising issues and challenging automatic ways of thinking and social 
norms, which is why those with less power in electoral arenas resort to them. 
They help constitute norms and culture as well as simply reflect cultural norms. 
Yet entrenched tropes, such as that women are liars or temptresses, can go un-
challenged in the legal arena, making it virtually impossible for victims to hold 
rapists accountable, for example. 
                                                                                                                                 
2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/young_lawyers/2014_sp 
ring_conference/practicing_law_while_breaking_confines_bias.authcheckdam.pdf [https://p 
erma.cc/9988-W7EE]. 
32  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). 
33  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599–600. Justice Scalia made this comparison in his dissenting 
opinion and often since then in public speeches. See, e.g., Liz Posner, Antonin Scalia Com-
pares Gay Americans to Criminals Again & He Seriously Needs to Stop, BUSTLE (Nov. 18, 
2015), https://www.bustle.com/articles/124856-antonin-scalia-compares-gay-americans-to-
criminals-again-he-seriously-needs-to-stop [https://perma.cc/Z2N4-6EJL]. Yet after I deliv-
ered these remarks, I received an anonymous letter for speaking about Justice Scalia in such 
an offensive way. 
34  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
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Central to my argument is the distinction between facts and law. The last 
election revealed that we have a profound disjuncture in our society about basic 
facts, and now we have alternative facts.35 Was Barack Obama born in the 
United States? Is our climate changing? Did the Pope endorse Donald Trump? 
Is Hillary a leader of a pedophile ring in a pizza parlor? Whether abortion pro-
viders need hospital admitting privileges to keep their patients safe is a judg-
ment, to be sure, but more on the objective fact side of the spectrum. It is what 
we call an empirical question. Those who have different views about the moral-
ity or constitutionality of abortion can weigh the evidence and agree.  
The effect of such rules in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas is empirically 
clear: fewer abortions will occur. Many disputes before the Supreme Court turn 
on these questions of social facts. One’s beliefs about facts often reflect one’s 
interests and preconceptions, to be sure, but the difference is one of degree. The 
question is not only the narrow one of whether the advances toward Michelle 
Vinson were welcome or the sex consensual, but what is the context for black 
women in the workplace faced with harassment by black men, as Angela 
Onwauchi-Willig demonstrated in her opinion on Vinson for the Feminist 
Judgements Project.36 Price Waterhouse’s partners are more likely to judge 
Ann Hopkins through the prism of stereotypes if the workplace is extremely 
gender skewed. Do we have a system of stopping people for driving-while-
black? Do late term abortions make women depressed, a question Shoshona Er-
lich carefully examined in her paper for this conference.37 Are women more 
likely to lie about sexual assault than other alleged victims of crime? Should 
batterers be custodial parents? Or, most famously, is strip searching an adoles-
cent girl unnecessarily traumatic?38 The latter, I call social facts. In their intro-
duction on page 22, the Feminist Judgments editors call it the situated perspec-
tive of judging.39 
To say that law is more than a system of rules, or even that the rules them-
selves are political, and to recognize law is a discourse that structures political 
power, and that law is an arena that advantages some over others, or to even 
say courts should be representative institutions,40 is not to say that judges them-
                                                        
35  Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House Offered ‘Alternative Facts’ on Crowd Size, 
CNN POLITICS (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kelly 
anne-conway-alternative-facts/ [https://perma.cc/8MYL-Q8D8]. 
36  Angela Onwauchi-Willig, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), in 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS 303, 309–10 (Kathryn M. Stanchi et al. eds., 2016). 
37  J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Ministering (In)Justice: The Supreme Court’s Misreliance on Abor-
tion Regret in Gonzalez v. Carhart, 17 NEV. L.J. 599 (2017); see also Kimberly Kelly, The 
Spread of ‘Post Abortion Syndrome’ as Social Diagnosis, 102 SOC. SCI. & MED. 18, 24 
(2014). 
38  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 (2009). 
39  Kathryn M. Stanchi et al., Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, in 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 36, at 1, 22. 
40  See chapter 6 in SALLY J. KENNEY, GENDER & JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY 
REALLY MATTER (2013).  
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selves are indistinguishable from legislators, executives, bureaucrats, or other 
policy makers. So what is a principled and consistent position for feminists 
about the nature of judging and the politics of judicial selection? 
I part company with two groups of allies by arguing that we need equal 
gender and race representation on courts and that we should advocate for judg-
es with greater feminist consciousness on the bench, but we should recognize 
those two goals are not one and the same.41 As an advocate of equal treatment, I 
do not think it is permissible for Republicans to discriminate against women 
and minority men in selecting judges from among conservatives. Nor should 
we use gendered or raced arguments or sit quietly while others do so. To para-
phrase Brenda Hale, what matters is not whether women judges are different 
but the message their absence sends.”42 It is important to have women and mi-
nority men on the bench for the symbolic message about who can sit in judg-
ment over others, who can lead, and who can wield the power of life and death. 
So I part company with some feminist colleagues and groups who want only 
progressives on the bench and place little importance on diversity and represen-
tation. Perhaps one of the most important roles progressives can play in opposi-
tion is to monitor what I call reversals—when women or minority men on the 
bench are replaced by men or white people. That is not the same thing as saying 
that women and minority men should receive less scrutiny than others, but we 
should be consistent in demanding that they not receive more, or be held to a 
double standard. Women nominees have faced harsher questioning from the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.43 
I also part company with many of my good government allies who favor 
merit selection under the coalition umbrella of the group Justice at Stake. Car-
ing about gender and racial diversity as I do, I am not persuaded that judicial 
elections are intrinsically evil and that leaving judicial selection to the legal 
                                                        
41  Id. I would like to write an entire essay on the usage of the phrase, “just because she’s a 
woman,” as in, “do you support Sonia Sotomayor for the Supreme Court just because she’s a 
woman,” implying that one could have no reasons other than gender equality to support her. 
To say that I believe sex discrimination against women conservatives is wrong is not the 
same thing as saying I support all women equally for judicial positions, or automatically fa-
vor women over men. 
42  Lady Brenda Hale, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Fiona Woolf Lecture for Women’s Law-
yers’ Division of the Law Society (Jun. 27, 2014), https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/spe 
ech-140627.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2AW-JC37]. 
43  See Christina Boyd et al., The Role of Nominee Gender and Race at Supreme Court Con-
firmation Hearings, Southern Political Science Association 2017 Annual Meeting (Jan. 9, 
2017), http://spsa.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/SPSA-2017-Preliminary-Program-v4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4Y7L-K4PN]. Dancey, Nelson, and Ringsmuth found that the questions 
senators asked district court nominees had little to do with their qualifications and much to 
do with institutional and political factors, such as proximity to an election. Logan Dancey et 
al., Individual Scrutiny or Politics as Usual? Senatorial Assessment of U.S. District Court 
Nominees, 42 AM. POL. RES. 784, 784–86 (2014). 
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elite will produce better justice.44 I have demonstrated that no one judicial se-
lection system is more likely than another to produce a diverse and representa-
tive bench.45 Rather, we need to educate selectors (and vice presidential candi-
dates) about implicit bias and set an explicit goal of representation.46 I believe 
calling for so-called merit selection does little to foster a diverse and repre-
sentative bench and obfuscates the nature of judging. 
As one who has spent thirty years teaching constitutional law, comparative 
law, EU law, women and the law, as well as law and policy, I am disillusioned 
with the progressive positions on both the nightmare and the noble dream. As a 
board member of Watch,47 a court monitoring organization on domestic vio-
lence and sexual assault, I argued that we needed to move beyond arguing for 
so-called merit selection. We needed to argue for more than that judges be well 
qualified. We needed to know whether they understood the facts about domes-
tic violence and sexual assault. Did they believe boys cannot thrive without 
their fathers, so much that batterers should retrain custody; are they indifferent 
to the evidence that joint custody puts mothers at risk? Do they believe women 
routinely lie about domestic violence in divorce cases? Or sexual assault in 
general? Do they easily dismiss women’s fear of stalkers and harassers? Do 
they know that police officers and those serving in the military are significantly 
more likely than the general population to be batterers? What does that fact 
mean for the policy question of whether batterers deserve to retain their fire-
arms even after threatening intimates? We need to know a lot about judges’ 
views of these social facts to know whether the laws we have passed to protect 
against intimate partner violence will have any effect. Such inquiries are differ-
ent from asking judges their policy preferences, although these two are linked. 
It is different from simply asking whether judges are liberal or conservative or 
pro-life or pro-choice or whether they believe violence against women violates 
women’s international human rights or is a private matter states can ignore. 
To support the Sotomayor nomination, I was part of a group trained by 
those who developed the media strategy to prevent the U.S. Senate from con-
firming Robert Bork. They coached us to say that we wanted, well-qualified 
women on the bench, since so few citizens support a gender-diverse bench for 
its own sake. So many things troubled me about the strategy of focusing simply 
on merit. Strategists believed we could only succeed by propagating the noble 
dream—that the qualities of merit we wanted were simple legal credentials. 
                                                        
44  See generally CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS (2009) (providing data that judicial elections enhance democracy by intimately 
linking the electorate with the judiciary). 
45  Kenney, Sally, GENDER & JUDGING, http://genderandjudging.tulane.edu/?page_id=214 
[https://perma.cc/LX5F-F5G6] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). 
46  Sally J. Kenney, Which Judicial Systems Generate the Most Women Judges? Lessons 
from the United States, in GENDER AND JUDGING 461 (Ulrike Schultz & Gisela Shaw eds., 
2013). 
47  WATCH, https://watchmn.org/ [https://perma.cc/6RW4-NMX4] (last visited Apr. 18, 
2017). 
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Justice Sotomayor, despite being a wise Latina woman and therefore presumed 
incompetent and biased, was well qualified by any standard: she was well edu-
cated and had distinguished herself as a lawyer. But so had Robert Bork. I part 
company with my so-called merit selection colleagues because I care about 
more than the legal qualifications of prospective judges. I care about their judi-
cial philosophy, and I care about their views on social facts and most im-
portantly, their willingness to subject their views to rigorous empirical exami-
nation. 
We “dog whistle”48 around these issues by talking about experience and 
background. Working in the domestic violence movement or as a death penalty 
lawyer or a public defender does shape one’s perspective, but experience and 
views on social facts are not necessarily connected. We know all too clearly 
that sex or race cannot be proxy for holding certain values around racism and 
sexism. Conservatives know better than anyone that Republican governors can 
be persuaded that segregated schools are unconstitutional,49 and corporate law-
yers can conclude that the right to choose an abortion is part of a fundamental 
right of privacy.50 They can conclude that the time is not right to overrule Roe 
v. Wade,51 or declare the Affordable Care Act unconstitutional.52 Conserva-
tives’ sabotaging of Harried Miers has demonstrated that they were no longer 
willing to take any risks about nominees’ policy positions. 
So what differentiates my position from Donald Trump’s? Trump has iden-
tified the policy positions he wants in a jurist. He wants someone who will de-
clare the Affordable Care Act unconstitutional and overturn Roe v. Wade but 
not, paradoxically, Obergefell.53 As on so many issues from immigration to his 
views on women, Trump is not “dog whistling” when he talks about the Court, 
as nearly all previous presidential candidates have done. He does not couch his 
positions in the discourse of original intent, states’ rights, judicial restraint, or 
privacy. He has completely adopted the discourse of the nightmare, and wants 
no surprises. 
I am deeply troubled that in these times, being empathetic renders one un-
qualified in the minds of some. I am troubled that calling yourself a feminist or 
even being an active member of the National Association of Women Judges 
                                                        
48  IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS ix (2014). 
49  See, e.g., Thomas H. Kuchel, Earl Warren Chief Justice of the United States, 64 CAL. L. 
REV. 2, 4 (1976). 
50  See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of Medical Independ-
ence, 72 BROOK. L. REV., 147, 174–89 (2006). 
51  Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Telling Court Opinion; the Ruling’s Words Are 
About Abortion, But They Reveal Much About the Authors, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at A12. 
52  Josh Gerstein, Conservatives Steamed at Chief Justice Roberts’ Betrayal, POLITICO (Jun. 
25, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/gop-conservatives-angry-sup 
reme-court-chief-john-roberts-obamacare-119431 [https://perma.cc/84DY-JL3Y]. 
53  Ariane de Vogue, Trump: Same-Sex Marriage is ‘Settled,’ but Roe v. Wade Can Be 
Changed, CNN POLITICS (Nov. 15, 2016, 7:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/14/poli 
tics/trump-gay-marriage-abortion-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/6BCH-STF3]. 
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might render one unsuitable. President Carter, in contrast, required his women 
(but not men) judicial nominees to have demonstrated a commitment to equal 
justice under law. Justice Ginsburg has stated she could probably not be con-
firmed in the current political climate having been a public interest litigator and 
having declared her views that the death penalty was unconstitutional and the 
Constitution protected women’s reproductive freedom.54 As progressives 
mulled over who President Obama might nominate to replace Justice Scalia, 
public defenders such as Jane Kelly or judges who have upheld the rights of the 
accused were deemed tainted for high judicial office given their vulnerability to 
right-wing media attacks.55 
Authors such as Linda Greenhouse in celebrating Justice Blackmun,56 or 
Jeffrey Toobin in valorizing Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, argue the merits of 
middle-of-the-road judges who “have an open mind.”57 I cannot understand 
how having a position on the important issues of our times, such as whether 
women can control their own bodies or the government should be able to act to 
minimize the continuing effects of systemic racism somehow makes one a less 
worthy candidate to be a judge. I do, however, think there is a difference be-
tween one’s view as to whether the death penalty is unconstitutional because it 
is cruel and unusual punishment as a matter of thinking about the Constitution 
as a living document that was a guarantee of rights, not a grant of power to 
state and federal governments, is a different discussion than whether the death 
penalty, as applied, is disproportionately leveled against minorities or whether 
it functions as a deterrent. 
I think the virtue we are looking for in judges, beyond their legal philoso-
phy and understanding of social facts, is not open mindedness in the sense of 
not having a position but instead in having humility and integrity, by which I 
mean principled intellectual consistency. Political scientist Howard Gillman 
sets out what that entails in his book, The Votes that Counted about Bush v. 
Gore.58 He looked for judges who consistently upheld rules even when those 
rules went against the interests of the political party of the executive who ap-
pointed them or their designated political party in a partisan election state, such 
as Florida. The Supreme Court’s majority, by contrast, had to radically switch 
positions on years of equal protection jurisprudence and rulings on the non-
justiciability of election outcomes to side with the party of the president who 
appointed them. Such behavior supports the views of the cynics as well as those 
who, unlike me, see nothing distinctive about legal decision making from other 
public policy choices. 
                                                        
54  I would still like to see her recant her historically inaccurate position on Roe that, if the 
Court had more narrowly decided the case, states would have continued to slowly liberalize 
abortion laws. See generally LINDA HIRSHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW (2015). 
55  HERMAN SCHWARTZ, RIGHT WING JUSTICE (2004). 
56  LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN (2005). 
57  JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE (2007). 
58  HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED 8 (2001). 
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The Senate easily confirmed Merrick Garland to the D.C. Circuit in 1997 
with the support of seven Republican senators.59 He was recognized as a cen-
trist who was well qualified. President Obama did not think courts should lead 
social change, which is why he, as a law graduate, turned to community organ-
izing and legislating rather than public interest litigation. In the past, those sen-
ators who voted against a nominee had to explain that the nominee was, in their 
view, unqualified to sit on the Court.60 Senators had to explain that the nomi-
nee’s views were outside the legal mainstream or that they lacked judicial tem-
perament or integrity. The could focus on their views, too, of social facts. Now, 
it appears, that the senators can “just say no,” what Emily Bazelon calls “Su-
preme Court Hardball.”61 Over the last five years, a progressive coalition of na-
tional and state groups under the umbrella name Why Courts Matter sought to 
hold senators accountable for failing to do their job.62 They drew attention to 
the cynical double standard between how the Senate had treated the nominees 
of President Obama, President Bush, and every other president in American 
history.63 They spoke out against senators who left vacancies on the federal 
courts by refusing to put names forward, particularly in Texas.64 They high-
lighted the number of judicial emergencies in federal courts who did not have 
enough judges because of vacancies to manage their case load. 
What will this movement’s strategy be as President Trump enjoys a majori-
ty in the Senate? Dahlia Lithwick proposed the answering nihilism with nihil-
ism in Slate: 
The only proper response from progressives today must be that Donald Trump is 
a lame-duck president with only four years left in his term, and we must let the 
people decide the next justice for the Supreme Court. Less fatuously, it must be 
to obstruct the nomination and seating of any Trump nominee to fill Scalia’s 
seat. We will lose. But that’s not the point now. Democrats need to repeat Ted 
Cruz’s lie that eight justices will suffice. If Democrats can muster the energy to 
fight about nothing else, it should be this, because even if you believe the elec-
                                                        
59  Nomination of Merrick B. Garland, of Md., to be U.S. Circuit Judge for D.C.: Hearing 
before the Senate, 105th Cong. (1997). 
60  BINDER & MALTZMAN, supra note 22. 
61  Emily Bazelon, Supreme Court Hardball, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016, 4:44 PM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/opinion/election-night-2016/supreme-court 
-hardball [https://perma.cc/46E6-N68W]. 
62  WHY COURTS MATTER, supra note 5. 
63  Presidents before the 1980s enjoyed a 90 percent confirmation rate for judges on district 
courts and courts of appeals. Between 1981 and the end of Obama’s first term, that number 
declined to 65 percent. President Obama’s nominees, however, waited much longer than 
previous nominees to be confirmed. Binder & Maltzman, supra note 9, at 402–03. 
64  John Cornyn and Ted Cruz’s Texas: A State of Judicial Emergency, ALL. FOR JUSTICE, 
http://www.afj.org/our-work/issues/judicial-selection/texas-epicenter-of-the-judicial-vacanc 
y-crisis [https://perma.cc/7LN2-BHAQ] (last updated Sept. 6, 2016). 
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tion was fair or fair enough, the loss of this Supreme Court seat was not. That 
seat is Merrick Garland’s.65 
So we should now say all of our arguments about taking turns, judicial 
emergencies, and do your job were just ploys on our part and embrace the ar-
guments of conservatives that we spend the last six years attacking? Even if we 
do, and the Democrats filibuster the replacement for Scalia, the most likely out-
come as Lithwick recognizes is the end of the filibuster, a mere artifact of Sen-
ate rules and conventions. And what of the 100 or so vacancies on lower 
courts? And the likely need for replacements for Justices Ginsburg (age 83), 
Kennedy (80), and Breyer (78)? 
 When I wrote this piece decrying the cynicism of Republicans I anticipated 
that Hillary Clinton would be President. If all my arguments switch immediate-
ly, have I not given into the nightmare? I am not a nihilist nor even a judicial 
behaviorist. I do not believe Democrats or feminists will ultimately be well 
served by making unprincipled arguments. But I confess I am confounded by 
how one plays with a party that does not recognize turn taking. My position is 
that discourse constrains those of integrity and the response to lack of integrity 
should not be a race to the bottom or no integrity but the exposure of hypocrisy. 
To return for a moment to Howard Gillman’s book, The Votes that Counted, 
Gilman explains that Gore was hoist on his own petard, so to speak, by taking 
the position that every vote should count rather than demanding votes count 
when they were Democratic votes and seeking to throw them out if they were 
absentee ballots from overseas military that a Republican official had illegally 
signed.66 But that does not mean the answer should be the results-oriented deci-
sion of Bush v. Gore. A similar scenario confronted the Northern Ireland Wom-
en’s Coalition in voting in a new Constitution to bring peace to Northern Ire-
land.67 The group’s slogan was “Wave Goodbye Dinosaurs.” They rejected the 
arguments of the men in all parties who refused to ever compromise but instead 
would simply withdraw from negotiations or bring down a coalition govern-
ment. They wanted a different politics than a politics of “I get my way or I do 
not play.” Instead, they aimed for bargaining. In the end, they were not willing 
to hold peace in Northern Ireland and a new constitution hostage to their de-
mand for electoral reform. Once they gave in to the demand, their party fold-
ed.68 But peace remains in Northern Ireland and, most importantly, their posi-
tion that politics is about compromise, bargaining, and turn taking began to 
                                                        
65  Dalitha Lithwick, Republicans Stole the Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (Nov. 14, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/11/what_democrats_sh
ould_do_about_the_supreme_court.html [https://perma.cc/PJ6P-VFRT]. 
66  GILLMAN, supra note 58, at 52. 
67  Sally J. Kenney, Waving Goodbye to Dinosaurs? Women, Electoral Politics, and Peace in 
Northern Ireland (2005) (unpublished comment). https://www2.tulane.edu/newcomb/upload/ 
casedinosaurs.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM83-WFFX]. 
68  Id. 
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establish new political norms, one of which was the inclusion of women in 
governance. 
 As we go forward, we have to explain our position between the nightmare 
and the noble dream to citizens as well as to the Senate. We need judges who 
act on legal principles, but understand that legal decision making is not deduc-
tive, but do not engage in a results-oriented jurisprudence. Perhaps even more 
importantly, we need judges who are able to evaluate evidence about social 
facts. The evidence in the amicus brief by women’s historians, for example, is 
stronger than the Justice Foundation’s in Carhart.69 When it is not our turn to 
select judges, we need to insist on nominees who understand legal rules and 
principles and can evaluate evidence fairly. We can probe their views on social 
facts, as the Senate did with Robert Bork, as well as interrogate judicial philos-
ophy. As postmodern feminist theory teaches us, integrity and feminist con-
sciousness are not necessarily connected to any bodily formation or set of expe-
riences, even as we know that widening the range of experiences of judges 
could increase the likelihood of a robust interrogation of claims of social facts. 
 The record does not lead us to be optimistic about the possibilities in the 
near future. Rather, it shows that the more people know about disputes over 
judges, the less legitimacy the system has. Binder and Maltzman found that 
Senate disagreements about judges sends a signal to independents that the 
judge is immoderate70 and contested votes depress support for the judge, even 
after controls.71 Gibson and Caldeira’s examination of the Alito confirmation 
showed that deeply contested nominations make citizens question judges judi-
ciousness and that interest group campaigns reinforce a view that the Supreme 
Court is just another political institution.72 
 In this time of not simply divided government but polarization, one of the 
most important issues we can work on is to eliminate partisan gerrymandering, 
practiced by both parties. We have created a political system where elected of-
ficials, particularly Republicans, are more worried about who is going to chal-
lenge them in a primary rather than appealing to the political center by winning 
over independents and supporters from both parties. The Republicans were 
more worried about being challenged by the Tea Party than interested in com-
promising with President Obama or their colleagues across the aisle in the Sen-
ate. Democrats have more at stake than seeming unprincipled by switching now 
to a policy of merely trying to blockade.73 Democrats need to show that gov-
ernment can work to solve our collective problems. For the Tea Party, it is 
                                                        
69  See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
70  BINDER & MALTZMAN, supra note 22, at 139. 
71  Id. at 140. 
72  JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS 
123–25 (2009). 
73  I support the work of scholars such as Martin Lipsky, formerly of Demos, who advocate 
for rehabilitating people’s sense of what government can do. See generally DEMOS, 
http://www.demos.org [https://perma.cc/VN5Y-44QL] (last visited Apr. 19, 2017). 
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more important to disrupt government to reduce it than to make it work for eve-
ryone. 
 As feminists, we must not stop working for a diverse and representative 
bench as we did in 1980 and 2000. We should not lose the momentum we have 
gained in the last six years. But we must retain our integrity and keep our prin-
ciples. Like John Rawls’s veil of ignorance as a device for determining justice, 
we need a system that we can honor when we are both in and out of office.74 
We need to be able to rotate. I happen to think we should have mandatory re-
tirement ages or fixed terms, as many countries do. I think we should consider 
judges in groups rather than one at a time, drawing on the lessons we know 
from political science that multimember districts and proportional representa-
tion help us manage conflict better than simple majoritarianism. I think we 
should be able to demand that judges be the most distinguished members of the 
legal profession (which is not necessarily those who excel at corporate law) 
without having to turn them into deductive machines or robots or think of them 
as neutrals. And I think we should look for people of integrity, empathy, and an 
ability to reason and change their minds when faced with evidence about social 
facts and persuasive argumentation. 
 It is incumbent on us as educators now more than ever to not be cynical 
but to educate the citizenry about what a feminist view of judging is, some-
where between the nightmare and the noble dream. We need women determin-
ing the rules and applying them alongside men. We need to recognize the im-
portance of judges as framers of questions and finders of social facts. I am 
grateful to the authors and editors of this impressive volume of Feminist Judg-
ments for showing us what that looks like. 
 
                                                        
74  Binder and Maltzman suggest a number of reforms that would change what they call a 
“medieval” system of path-dependent institutional choices that might work even in times of 
intense political polarization. BINDER & MALTZMAN, supra note 22, at 145. Their most recent 
work, however, muses whether we will be able to confirm a Supreme Court Justice if the 
President and the majority of the Senate are from different parties. See Binder & Maltzman, 
supra note 9, at 417–18. 
